Abstract-Nowadays, portable electronic devices allow users to access available resources wherever they are. In this sense, announcement and discovering of services and resources are two central problems to be solved in ubiquitous computing. Despite the fact that many service and resource discovery protocols exist, they are limited to a concrete network technology and most of them do not face mobility and security requirements for a global and ubiquitous solution. In this paper the authors introduce a Multiprotocol Service Discovery solution for heterogeneous networks and describe their work for including security as a main goal of the proposal.
I. INTRODUCTION
In these days we can see an explosion of portable devices. These devices have many characteristics in common: they are small, they have increasing computational power, they have wireless interfaces to communicate with the world and they are highly mobile. Even users of these devices have a characteristic that we have to take into account when developing new services: technology is not their main field of interest. This fact compels devices to automatically adapt themselves to the network topology and configuration. Moreover, devices have to be able to find the desired services among those available in each situation, without disturbing the user with manual configuration. Besides, new scenarios as peer to peer networks, ad-hoc configurations and distributed applications, where constant joining and leaving devices and/or services occur, require new ways to find services and resources. Clients demand that these mechanisms must be quick, reliable and secure.
In this paper, the concept of service is not limited to the traditional application, but extends its meaning to functions or "code pieces" that are offered through the network. This is the approach of Service Oriented Architecture [1] , heir of the Web Services architecture.
Traditional Service Discovery (SD) protocols enable a service to be announced within a network or a device This paper is based on "Providing Security Services in a Multiprotocol Service Discovery System for Ubiquitous Networks," by J. Vera del Campo, J. Pegueroles to know about the existence of a service in a network [2] . However, since the device will connect to just a few numbers of networks at once and the wireless devices in each network typically do not share addressing space, the number of accessible services and resources is actually low. Even in a single network, several service discovery protocols and middleware frameworks can exist. This reduces the number of services a single device is able to discover and access.
In this sense, a Multiprotocol Service Discovery (MSD) System will allow a device to move from one network technology to another using the same SD protocol. Even if a device is fixed in a network, the MSD system will propagate services from other networks and make them accessible for the fixed device. Such a system should be managed in a decentralized way, where the direct reachability of any node would not be mandatory.
When considering a global solution for Service Discovering in heterogeneous networks, security should be included as a design parameter. The described scenario is a potential target for security attacks. Services and clients are distributed over different networks and domains. Considered networks can be wireless with mobile nodes. Number of nodes in the network can reach up to tens or hundreds. Devices and services can appear and disappear in the global scenario. Therefore mechanisms for assuring the identity of the nodes, trust them and prevent eavesdropping of data from unauthorized parties have to be included in the resource discovering mechanisms.
To promote the development of a secure service discovery system independent from the network technology and topology the IST founded the UBISEC project (Ubiquitous Networks with a Secure Provision of Services, Access, and Content Delivery) under the Sixth Framework Programme [3] .
One of the tasks in UBISEC project was the design and specification of a Multiprotocol Service Discovery Framework allowing the mobility of services and devices through heterogeneous networks. In this paper we focus on the security aspects of the framework, and we propose several resource discovery mechanisms for this scenario.
This system, for instance, will allow a user with a Bluetooth mobile to print a photograph on the fly in a near printer located in an Ethernet network. In the example, several printers can coexist and intruders could exploit it to register a new "malicious" printer in order to capture data from the fair user. To avoid this, authenticated registration of services should be warranted. Using the MSD platforms, the discovering of available printers, the discarding of the malicious one and the routing of data through distinct networks will be completely transparent to the client application (See Fig. 1 ). Another real example is the secure sharing and distribution of restricted access files in a peer to peer fashion. Each peer can be automatically discovered and files in each peer will be classified according to the access policy. Only authorized users will be able to find and download certain files. Mechanisms to prevent not authorized users from accessing the files are provided by the MSD platform.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, in the design goals section, we focus the scope of this study and point out the main objectives, related to security, that the Multiprotocol Service Discovery platform must achieve. Section III gives a brief overview of previous related work in the field of Secure Service Discovery Protocols. In order to understand how the required security services are included in the MSD, an overall description of the MSD functions and mechanisms is provided. Section IV presents the main contribution of this work: security services in MSD and how are they implemented. Section V analyzes the problem of distributing information about available resources through the network to ensure the maximal availability. Some mechanisms are presented, simulated and analyzed in this section. In section VI, we explain the security in different phases of the MSD functions and the testbed developed in order to demonstrate the achieved results. We conclude with a summary of the contribution, future work and references.
II. DEFINITIONS, ASSUMPTIONS AND DESIGN GOALS
For the sake of clarity, in this section we are going to introduce the definitions of the main concepts used in this work. This will help the reader to understand the real scope of the work. After that, in the assumptions subsection, some restrictions for our model are explained. Finally, we tackle the design goals for the multiprotocol service discovery platform regarding security.
A. Definitions
From the examples and scenarios described in the previous section we identify the next components of our model.
Elementary network: (EN) is a set of devices that belong to a network where every node can create a direct connection to the rest of nodes. Devices in different elementary networks may or may not be able to communicate (e.g., incompatible IP addressing or no routing between them). Depending on their underlying characteristics, ENs may vary greatly in terms of size (e.g., from a Bluetooth piconet with 4 devices to a largescale MANET with hundreds of devices), or dynamic (e.g., home network with stable membership versus highly dynamic ad-hoc network).
Bridge: is a device that belongs to several Elementary Networks through different network interfaces and that is able to route messages between the ENs.
Global network: (GN) is a dynamic federation of ENs, with some of the devices acting as bridges/gateways between two or more ENs.
Client: is the entity accessing to a service or looking for a resource. A client can be a real person or some piece of software. A client is always related to a single EN but can freely move from one EN to another. Clients want this mobility to be network seamless and as transparent as possible.
Server: is the entity offering services or resources. Before accessing to resources, clients must know the network address of servers by means of a static configuration or using any dynamic Service Discovery Protocol as those described in this work. Same as clients, servers are always related to a single EN. In this work we suppose that servers are as mobile as clients, and can enter and leave EN.
Services: are a facility providing others with the use of something. A service can be any kind of resource as a physical facility, a piece of information, or even a software system designed to support interoperable machine-tomachine interaction over a network, as in Web Services [1] . Services are offered by servers but services are not related to a single EN. Indeed, services propagate themselves through the whole Global Network. In this sense, clients and servers could be in different EN and yet being able to communicate.
According to the above definitions, in the example described in the introduction (Fig. 1) , there are two elementary networks (Bluetooth and Ethernet), one bridge between them, the printers in the Ethernet networks are servers offering a printing service and the mobile phone is the client of the printer. The two connected ENs make a Global Network.
B. Assumptions
In the scope of this document we are going to assume the following:
Addressing system: Every EN has a common addressing space, but devices in different ENs cannot directly connect each other. Servers and clients in different ENs need the support of one or more bridges to discover and connect themselves.
PKI & Trust Model: This document supposes that there exist some mechanisms to prove the trust of nodes in the Global Network. Such a mechanism can be the traditional trust/not trust of PKI or the enhanced ePKI proposed in [4] , where pairs have a level of trust according to some policies and the connected status of the Authority Certification.
Accessing to a Service: This document assumes that clients and services know how to interact once the connection is established. Due to the nature of messages interchanged in the platform, the XML-RPC format is advisable, although CORBA, Java Stubs, WSDL or direct streams can be used as well in the communication. The service may need some level of security at application level apart from the security provided by the MSD platform.
MSD Platform Functions: The work described in this paper refers only to the security aspects of the whole system. We assume that basic functions MSD platform exist and work properly. A slight description of the whole system is provided in Sec. III-B, although more details can be found in [5] .
C. Design Goals
Once an MSD platform with basic functions exists, the goals of this work regarding security can be described as followed.
DoS Prevention: The MSD should avoid denial of service attacks; in other words, the whole system should not be unavailable due to the fall of any of its nodes. Mechanisms for fast reactivation of crucial functions must be considered.
Identity Hijacking Prevention: Participants in the MSD have to be sure that claimed identities are true. In this sense, servers must warrant their identity in order to avoid brand theft and clients should proof theirs to avoid fraud.
Authorization & Control Access: According to the authenticated identities, parties in the MSD should select access to services and/or information depending on an authorization policy.
Availability: Due to the nature of wireless networks, resources quickly appear and disappear in the surroundings of clients. Besides, servers could be as small as clients and then balance-loading and resource duplication are important points in this architecture. In this sense, the MSD platform must provide ways to warrant availability of resources once discovered.
Data Eavesdropping Prevention: Finally, data exchanged during the MSD execution (management and service data) should require to have restricted access to a certain subgroup of recipients.
III. SERVICE DISCOVERY IN HYBRID NETWORKS
The classical service discovering protocols (SLP, SDP, uPnP, PDP, etc [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] ) face the problem of finding previously unknown services. However, none of them gives a whole solution according to the examples explained in Sec. I. Current solutions for these problems rely on application level authentication at the client side. Typically are bounded to a single stack, as TCP/IP for SLP or Bluetooth for SDP. Most of them do not face security at all, letting the register of untrusted services that can eventually act maliciously. Finally, current SD protocols do not support access to the end service, and that is a serious drawback when clients and servers are not in the same EN. In the next subsection we briefly describe the existing solutions and point out why they are not suitable for our scenario.
A. Related Work
The authors do not know about the existence of a global solution for all the problems mentioned in Sec. I. However, next we describe the main features of the existing SD protocols and their drawbacks.
1) SDP:
The Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) [7] was the SD chosen by the Bluetooth SIG to search for services in Bluetooth networks. Clients connect to all the prior discovered Bluetooth devices in the proximity and checks if they are offering the desired service. SDP uses a very simple scheme where security relies on a secure pairing between devices and scalability is limited to a low number of devices (up to eight). Clearly, these features are not enough in terms of security and scalability for the scenario presented in the previous sections.
Besides the limitations described in the above paragraph, SDP only works for Bluetooth networks and there is no way to run SDP on any other network technology. Moreover, different practical attacks have been described against the security of the Bluetooth stack at network level [10] .
2) SLP: The service Location Protocol [6] is the only SD protocol supported by the IETF. It is described in RFC2608. Using this protocol, the client multicasts a template of the service and any server receiving the message compares the pattern with its own services. If any service matches, the server answers to the client with the address of the service. An optional cache of services may be available.
Such a protocol has a very weak security support. Although the services can be signed with the private key of the server, every client has to maintain the public key of every server in the network, and that means that the server must be known or configured prior to the discovering. On the other hand, sending the address in clear makes possible attacks such as DNS or IP spoofing. Any user using SLP must use some kind of authentication in the application layer. The security flaws in SLP are described in [11] and [12] .
3) Jini: Jini [13] is a middleware platform for the creation of distributed systems supported by Sun Microsystems. One of the core modules of Jini is a service discovery protocol. Servers register their services in a central repository and clients use this cache to get a Java object to interact with the server. Security is really strong and supported by the Java Cryptographic Extension (JCE).
However, Jini is tied to the Java programming language, it is mainly focused in the description of devices in local networks and it does not support global connectivity of elementary networks.
4) JXTA:
The JXTA(TM) project [14] is the major contributor to heterogeneous and mobile platforms. It is sponsored by Sun Microsystems. JXTA is a bunch of protocols for peer-to-peer architectures heavily focused in the discovering of remote peers and their services. JXTA is not bounded to a single programming language; it provides light protocols and includes the security provided by the JCE platform.
However, JXTA does not support other protocol than its own and it is not possible to access to services registered in other SDs. Hence, both server and client must be aware of the existence of the JXTA platform. Moreover, the JXTA platform is focused in providing globally distributed services as instant messaging, and its support to choose services by proximity (for instance, printers) is low.
In order to overcome all the above explained limitations, the UBISEC project defined the MSD platform as a global solution for secure and heterogeneous discovering of services. The MSD definition and development was leaded by the INRIA institute within one of the UBISEC work packages. The authors contributed to it by including the security features to the platform. Next, the MSD solution is explained.
B. MSD Proposal
Since none of the current service discovery protocols achieve the objectives, UBISEC proposed the Multiprotocol Service Discovery System (MSD). It is intended to be a middleware platform that lets applications to discover and use services in heterogeneous, mobile and insecure network environments. Main requirements of the MSD platform where designed by INRIA [5] in the UBISEC Project [3] . The authors of this work contributed to the project by defining and including security features to the platform.
As stated in Fig. 2 , the system architecture is structured in five modules: cache, network, security, group management and proxies for other service discovery protocols. The cache and network modules are the core system and on their own let the registering, discovering and using of services including bridging between different networks and roaming. The rest of the modules are pluggable in those devices with more features.
We define an entity running an MSD, or MSD for short, as a piece of software that includes all core modules listed above. In general, each MSD can take the role of client, Figure 2 . The modules of the MSD server or bridge, depending on the needs. A single device is allowed to run several MSDs at once. This operation way is intended to run in a peer-to-peer fashion, without the need of a central repository. When a centralized server is needed (for instance for compatibility reasons with concrete Service Discovery Plugins as SLP) an algorithm executed among all MSD entities with complete functions will result in the election of an MSD manager performing all the centralized functions.
1) Network Module: The network module sets an abstract P2P layer between the MSD and the actual network interface. There is no need of a common address space or even a common network configuration. That is, the MSD can be set in a local WiFi network, in the wild of Internet or in a Bluetooth network. The MSD sends and receives packeted units called Messages. These messages can be unicasted, multicasted or multiplexed inside Connections. The MSDs identify each other by means of a Universal Unique Identifier (UUID). There can be MSDs in any network acting as bridges and routing messages between the network interfaces they have got. The messages through the network can be of several types: control messages containing information for the administration of the MSD network (i.e. beacons, certificates or keys); discovery messages containing information about the services and searches; and finally service messages used for the actual use of services and containing the data for a certain type of service. An abstraction of the network structure can be summarized in Fig. 3 . 2) Group: The ability to group nodes is a main feature for the MSD platform. Groups are a central point in the security structure of the platform. Grouping nodes makes distributed authorization easy, and if members of a group share a secret privacy and confidentiality could be warrented inside the group members. Groups are not limited to a single EN they may have members extended in the whole GN. Each group in the MSD platform is managed by a leader that must be elected among the members. Groups as a security mechanism for authentication, authorization and confidentiality will be discussed in depth in Sec. IV.
3) Proxies: The proxies' module is in charge of discovering the services offered in an EN. There is a proxy for each service discovery protocol integrated in the system. Current prototype includes proxies for the SLP and SDP protocols. Once the proxy discovers services in an EN, it converts the information to a common XML regardless of the actual protocol of the service description. In each EN a special group is formed and its leader runs the plugins for the SDs. More details on this module can be found in Sec. V.
4) Cache:
The system cache stores all the information collected about the available services by the proxies' module. The information in the cache is shared between all the MSDs, and therefore an efficient sharing scheme must be created. This scheme must allow every MSD to know every available service, even when the service has not a direct path to the MSD. Some mechanism to share the information in the cache module will be described in Sec. V. Inside the cache module, information is stored using XML. This technology facilitates the sharing of data across different systems and its hierarchical structure is suitable for most types of documents.
IV. SECURITY SERVICES AND MECHANISMS
In a global scenario as the one mentioned in the introduction, many kinds of attacks such as eavesdropping, replaying, man in the middle, etc. can be carried out. Most of them take advantage of the open and wireless network nature as the weakest feature of the described environment.
A deep analysis of possible attacks in concluded that threats to Service Discovery protocols mostly concern the theft of the identity of some user in order to take advantage of his privileges, and the theft of the brand of a server used by malicious servers to attract potential clients. Moreover, information attached to service descriptions, especially user profiles, should be protected against unauthorized third parties wishing to collect private data from clients.
The following sections revise the security services that would be desirable for a SD platform in order to prevent it from the mentioned attacks.
A. Data Integrity
Integrity is the property that data holds when it has not been modified in unauthorized ways. In practice it is impossible to prevent an attacker who has access to a wireless channel from altering the message, so what we actually want is to ensure that nobody can alter a message without noticing the recipient.
As part of the secure discovering of services, MSD agents exchange data with integrity. The way this is achieved is by means of the addition of a non-lineal hash function together with the sensitive data. The hash code is added as a header field to every message sent through the MSD network. Just after the arrival of a new message, the hash code is extracted and compared with the recalculated one. Depending on the accorded policy, one action is taken when hashes do not match (for instance, currently, the application shows a warning on screen). The use of a shared secret between the sender and the recipient of the message (or an authorized group of entities) also provides authenticity to these messages.
B. Authenticity
Authentication is the process of verifying someone's claimed identity. MSD platform must assure that information between agents comes from the sources that claim to be the origin. Authenticity is provided in the MSD platform in two different levels: individual and group authentication. Both are described next.
Passwords, one-time passwords and challenge-response protocols in combination with an enhanced form of Public Key Infrastructure (ePKI, [4] ) are among the proposed solutions for providing this service.
Individual authentication: First, new agents joining the MSD platform must provide identity proofs before entering the system. The validation of these credentials is currently done by means of the ePKI [4] . Each beacon message sent by the MSD entities has an associated credential with the attributes of the sender, and this certificate can be validated with the mentioned ePKI module. As stated before, the ePKI module has to be able of validating the authenticity of a credential even if it cannot connect to a TTP. In this case, a trust level is given together with a YES/NO answer.
Group authentication: Once the entering agent is authenticated, data sent by this agent is group authenticated by the use of a signed hash using a group (platform) key. The key is only known by authorized platform members (and revealed to them when accessing it). The knowledge of the key assures that the agent is an authorized member. By means of adding a digest signed with this shared key we can assure the member authentication. Group authentication is cheaper in computational cost and more efficient than individual authentication since keys are preknown and it uses symmetrical encryption. This kind of authentication is preferred to individual authentication in control and discovery messages. In some services, its lightness converts this authentication preferable even for service messages.
Besides being authenticated as a group member, any node can prove to any other member that is authorized to use the resources provided by the group by means of proving that it knows the group key. In this way, the group authorization is highly simplified. Besides this simple authorization, other schemes could be used at application level according to the policy of the service.
C. Data Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the property that information holds when it remains unknown to unauthorized principals. The MSD platform deals with two types of data: management data for announcing/discovering services; and data exchange when the service is accessed.
Management Data: Data in the management plane (i.e. service announcement) do not often require confidentiality. However, this functionality is also included among security capabilities of the control plane for using when needed. For example, a service description could be required only to be propagated within the platform without announcing it to the rest of SD plug-ins. Other important example is when clients do not desired that other entities know that they are looking for some special resource.
Service Data: When accessing the service, data exchanged between end entities of the service have to be protected against eavesdropping. The whole MSD platform consists of several subgroups with different MSD managers. All members in the same group share a group key that has nothing to do with other group keys.
This type of mechanism assures group confidentiality: no peer out of the MSD group can listen to the communication. On the other hand, any MSD in the group can decrypt the messages in the network since it has the group key. Most services requiring a high level of security implements some form of encryption at the application level, so assuring just group confidentiality seems enough level of security and has good performance. Anyway, for these services that want to ensure that none can decrypt the data, a secure point-to-point connection is provided by means of a SSL connection.
D. Key Management
Keys for group authentication and service data confidentiality have to be managed within the MSD platform. The library provides to every MSD in a group with a common key that can be used in the secure communications. The keys are distributed with an enhanced Logical Key Hierarchy tree using a single message scheme [15] , and the leader of the group must be elected in a secure way. The current implementation uses the secure election described in [16] .
E. Reachability and Availability
In general, availability is whether (or how often) a system is available for use by its intended users. Since downtime is usually very costly, this is an integral component of security. Reachability can be defined as the availability of the control plane. Security mechanisms must protect a system from a malicious reduction of its available time or, at least, include enough mechanisms for re-establishing the service if the system's availability is attacked. Availability and Reachability are maybe the most important security services that a SD must provide in order to be considered reliable. A SD can be considered useless if clients cannot access to services and resources discovered with the SD. This security service is provided by means of a global management of the MSD managers' service caches. Several algorithms for the distribution of the service description are provided, and they are based on the accuracy of the data cached in the whole network. In the MSD platform it is assured that a service is accessible in the very moment that it was discovered. Since the peers in the network are mobile, there are no means to ensure further reachability. Anyway, some control mechanism are implemented for unregistering services, such as removing from the local cache those services bridged or offered by a recently left MSD, especially if this MSD was running plugins for other SDs. This important issue will be discussed in depth in Sec. V.
While a client and server are connected some bridges in the middle of the way can change or leave. In such cases, a simple and transparent roaming mechanism is implemented and if there is an alternative way to reach the client or server the communication will not be lost.
F. Availability of Data
Finally, in order to guarantee the availability of the services a quick and distributed reactivation protocol is provided to rebuild the MSD agents' communications and structure if a group manager is compromised. An election algorithm is integrated in the platform to ensure that there is always a manager in each group of nodes. This algorithm notices the leaving or not existence of the manager reading the beacons and starts an election using the certificate of each station. Each station compares its attributes (for example, power, capacity and mobility) with the attributes in the credentials of the rest of the stations of the network and a common manager is elected. The mechanism used for the secure election of managers is explained in depth in [16] .
V. RESOURCE DISCOVERY IN THE MSD PLATFORM
The main objective of the MSD is providing access to those resources that are currently available to the user. In this sense, the resource searching is an essential feature of the MSD platform.
From the point of view of security, the resource discovery is directly related to the availability and reachability security services, as stated before. It is desirable that the service discovery protocols face availability in the next three ways:
Resource discovering: if a client discovers a resource, it must be available at least in the very moment of the discovering. Unfortunately, most service protocols provide some kind of description caching to enhance efficiency. Since the MSD stands over other SDs, it is not possible to warrant an absolute availability of resources. Anyway, the SD protocols and the MSD must be aware of the highly dynamic behaviour of nodes in networks, and take into account that servers may disappear without warning to the resource cache.
Service replication: if clients do not care about the exact location of servers or their actual identity, resources can be replicated in several servers. In this sense, availability of resources could be enhanced if the service discovery protocol is aware of the replication and provides results that are balanced with the current server loading. Besides, back-up servers can be sleeping until that the main server leaves the network, when they wake up and takes care of providing the resource to clients.
SD service: finally, the service discovery protocol must provide a way to ensure its own availability. If the SD needs that some nodes take special roles, such as central repository of service descriptions, the own SD must provide mechanisms to detect and restore the SD service after the disappearing of those special nodes.
Each service discovery protocol provides mechanisms of its own to ensure availability as described above. Since the MSD stands over other SD protocols, the proxy module manages these mechanisms transparently. In this section we are going to discuss several alternatives for the exchanging of information between MSD entities to provide availability. Those mechanisms take into account that the main objective of clients is looking for services that are available in their surroundings, and then the 'proximity' factor is one of the most importants when choosing among servers.
A. Algorithms 1) Single cache: In this algorithm the platform elects an entity called cache leader that is the only node in the GN that holds a complete knowledge of the whole system cache. As a result, when any other node in the GN wants to publish a new service or resource, sends the description to the cache leader. Clients that look for services must discover the cache leader and then send the resource pattern to get the list of available services.
In this algorithm the cache leader is a critical point of the system. It is elected among members of a special group of nodes that met several properties related to staticity of the server. Besides, those nodes not elected must monitore the cache leader to start another election in case the manager disappears.
One important point of this algorithm is the discovering of the cache leader at the first place. The preferred method is that newcomers to the GN ask to any node in their surroundings about the identity of the cache leader.
2) Shared cache: Using this algorithm every node in the GN maintains a complete and equal cache of services and resources in the GN. That is to say, all nodes store exactly the same cache. As a result, any query can be answered looking at the local cache and no message through the GN is necessary. When a node wants to publish a new service, the involved MSD broadcasts a message to notify the rest of the nodes about this change and in a few moments every MSD will end up having the same cache.
In this algorithm there is not any node with special roles and queries are really quick. On the other hand, changes in the list of available resources are expensive, as we will see in the Sec. V-B. Besides, instability in networks could provoke that some MSDs store deprecated or incorrect caches.
3) Hierarchical cache: With this algorithm nodes in the network are self-organized in trees. In each EN one node is elected and joins to a group of EN leaders. Among these nodes, another election takes place to choose a leader of leaders, or a so-called emperor. The number of levels in the tree is configurable, although we do not advise more than two or three levels. Any node that wants to publish the availability of a source just stores the information in its local cache. During the resource discovering phase, nodes send their queries to the emperor, which re-sends them to the leaders and all the way down the tree collecting query-results.
4) Distributed cache: This is a peer-to-peer algorithm. There is no central role in the network, and there are not any kind of cache of services or internal structure of nodes. When a node publish a service or resource, it is stored in its local cache. Clients that want to discover resources broadcast the description of the service and then wait for responses from those nodes that keep services matching the pattern. The discovering messages are routed through bridges through different ENs, flooding the entire GN. To limit the number of discovered services and reduce hop distance to the server, the discovering message has a limited and configurable number of hops.
B. Simulations
In order to test the presented algorithms we have developed a simulator with controlled and configurable environments. This simulator is available in [17] , as well as the working prototype of the MSD platform described in Sec. VI-B.
In the simulation, 'changes of resources' are understood as publishing of new resources as well as leavings and joinings of servers to the GN. On the other hand, 'discovering of resources' is when a client queries the platform to look for some kind of resource in his surroundings. We present the results of three different environments:
Environment A: There are as many resource changes as searches. This is the general case.
Environment B: There are much more changes that discovering of resources. This is the case of ad-hoc networks, where servers randomly enter and leave the network.
Environment C: There are much more queries that changes of resources. This is the case of static network configuration and server nodes, as Ethernet or infrastructured WiFi networks.
1) Environment A: Figure 4 shows an estimation of the total bytes sent in the network against time in environment A for modes single, shared and hierarchical. The shared and hierarchical modes behave in a similar way, while single mode needs much less messages and so bandwidth than the others. 2) Environment B: Figure 5 shows the estimation of the total bytes used against time in the environment B for modes single, shared and hierarchical. The single and shared modes have a similar behaviour that in environment A, but hierarchical mode significantly reduces its bandwidth, even with periods of time without activity. Figure 6 shows a scan diagram. If environment conditions change from environment A to B, this figure represents the average bytes used in each time instant. We can see that the shared mode is independent of this change of conditions, single mode changes just a bit and the hierarchical mode is extremely sensitive to the variation of the number of changes in the environment.
3) Environment C: Figure 7 shows the estimation of the total bytes used in the environment C for modes single, shared and hierarchical. Results in these environments are very similar to those in environment B, but shared and single exchange their roles, being the first one insensitive to the decreasing of changes. In this case, the bandwith used by the shared mode is drastically reduced. Figure 8 shows an average bandwidth scanned in time from environment A to environment C. 4) Special cases: Figure 9 shows a diagram of the number of bytes that enter the central node of the GN for modes shared, hierarchical and single for environment A. If we compare this figure with Fig. 4 , we can see Figure 10 shows the exchanged bytes and time scan from environment A to C for the distributed cache mode. We can see that the distributed mode is independent of the changes in the resources, as expected, but its performance is better during the searching of resource that the rest of modes. Anyway, the distributed mode has the major drawback in the flooding of messages that uses during the querying phase. If the number of searches is really big the network could be drowned by the messages that flood the GN. For example, in an environment where there are much more changes than searches, the hierarchical mode seems more suitable than the others in terms of bandwith and prevent the flooding problem of the distributed mode. Besides, this mode does not use the update method of single and shared modes, and then manages cache inconsistencies in a better way. Finally, the silent moments in hierarchical mode are highly beneficial in wireless networks in order to save battery life.
On the other hand, the shared mode is more efficient in those environments that are mainly static, when searches from clients are much more common that changes in servers. Besides, since every node in the GN has a complete knowledge of the network structure, routing of messages between nodes that use the shared cache is extremely easy and efficient. The rest of nodes need additional messages and complex algorithms in bridges to route messages in the GN. The route discovering is an easy task in single mode, but much more complex in hierarchical mode.
Finally, the single mode has a more constant behaviour in those environments that frequently change their conditions, although its dependence with the emperor could be a problem from the point of view of security and availability of the system. Backup nodes must be monitoring the emperor and they must be ready to immediately take its place in case of disappearing.
C. Hybrid approaches
It is possible to create hybrid approaches to the problem of information sharing. Some of the algorithms described in previous sections are compatible with each other, and in fact several ENs can work with different algorithms and the system will continue working.
For example, the hierarchical mode in the last step needs to consult a big number of leafs of the tree about service pattern. This last consult can be efficiently performed with the distributed cache mode limited to an EN. Other possible approach is to use the single mode in ENs to collect every service and resource description available in an EN leader. Then, EN leaders exchange information and descriptions using any of the other mechanisms, as shared mode or distributed cache. Even it is possible to dynamically change from one mechanism to another on the fly, as new properties, number of nodes or node loads in each EN advice to do so.
The final mechanism to distribute information is mainly limited by the nature of the EN, the number of nodes and the expected behaviour of them. In this sense, conclusions of the Sec. V-B are very useful.
D. Coordination with current SD protocols
Finally, we will discuss how these mechanisms integrate with those SD mechanisms described in Sec. III-A. Jini and the usual behaviour of SLP use a form of single mode, SDP uses distributed mode without bridging of messages between ENs and JXTA uses an hybrid approach, mainly distributed mode with some special caches of resource descriptions. This heterogeneity of modes must be managed by the proxy module of the MSD platform. The current implementation of the proxy module uses the next mechanism: one MSD in each EN gets elected to run the proxy module, then gather services and resources available in the EN through other SDs and publish them as being offered by itself. This is a special case of single mode just in one EN. In this sense, this MSD will act as a bridge between the actual server and clients in the GN. The algorithm used to share this information with the rest of nodes in the GN is independent of the proxy module, and any of the mechanisms described above can be used.
VI. SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTBED
In the next section we are going to describe in detail how the mechanism explained above have been implemented in the mechanisms of the MSD.
A. Security in MSD Actions
The design goals introduce in Sec. II and the security services and mechanisms described in Sec. IV have to be included in the performance of the MSD platform. The main actions to be considered in MSD are:
• Discovering other MSDs and Groups • Joining to Groups • Service Search • Service Access Security in Discovering other MSDs: To communicate two MSDs is necessary that they previously know each other UUID or address, if they are in different ENs or if they are in the same EN respectively. Two methods for this discovering are provided, one based on the received beacons and another one based on a previously known MSD.
Two threats were identified; malicious MSDs impersonating the personality of a valid MSD and malicious MSDs sending their own certificate trying to enter in the network. The security module should minimize the harm of these false beacons. If the discovery method is based on a known MSD, we are going to suppose that this first MSD is secure.
Beacons include the certificate of the MSD and are signed with the private key. A fake MSD with a copied certificate will not be able to provide a valid signing, so its beacon will be dropped. On the other hand, malicious MSDs with their own certificate will try to validate with the authentication module ePKI, and if they do not reach a confidence level their beacon will be dropped.
The MSDs without a valid beacon will not be discovered by the upper layers of the stack, and thus can not be contacted, making these MSDs as virtually nonexistent for the platform.
Security in Joining to Groups: The MSD network is structured in groups. Each member of a group will share a common key to secure the communications inside the group. Groups could have up to hundred of members across the GN, and in this case the distribution of the key when is compromised is not a simple problem. To distribute this shared key, we use an enhanced logical tree mechanism (Single Message LKH) that was proposed in [15] . In this case, the distribution of the key needs a central MSD acting as manager of the group. The election of this leader must be achieve in a secure way exchanging certificates and choosing the best between the interested MSD. Tenths of nodes can apply for being manager of a group, so we use the efficient method described in [16] . Once elected, the rest of MSDs joins to the leader and after a round of SM-LKH every peer in the group will have the same shared key. Any new one that wants to join to the group connects to the group leader which is accepting or not the new member according to its certificate and the authorization policy.
A new key distribution takes place after a conflicting situation, i.e., joining and leaving of group members. The key distribution module performs periodical rekeyings as well to enhance the security of the group. Besides, a new round for electing a leader of a group takes place periodically or when the leaving of the leader is detected.
Security in Service Search: Several algorithms for searching services in the Global Network where discussed in Sec. V. All of these mechanisms are based on providing to the platform with the template of the desired service in XML and after a short while the client will receive a list of services that match the template.
Three threats are identified in this phase. Fake bridges filtering messages can produce denial-of-service attack, not letting the discovery of valid services or modifying the service description of remote MSDs. Clients can search for templates to receive services they have not enough privileges to receive. Fake remote servers can be offering fake services.
All of these threats are managed by means of the authentication module and group communications. If a device has been accepted in a group, it has got a shared key to check authentication, authorization and integrity of messages of the group. In this case, those MSDs that are not members of the group will not be able to send messages to fool group members during the searching of services. Individual authentication can be proved asking for a certificate for the remote MSD before processing the searching request. If group messages are encrypted with the group key, MSDs that are not in the group cannot even understand that a node is looking for a resource.
Security in Service Access: Once the desired service is found, the client will connect to the server to use the service sending and receiving data. If the service has got some form of end to end security (as SSH or SSL) there is no need for further security method. On the other hand, if the service data is sent in clear (as most printing services do) or clients trust in the inherent network security (as most Bluetooth services do) the data is not save during its way through bridges.
For those services not including security, secured connections are provided at least for some hops in the GN. Messages between the initial MSD and the MSD offering the service are encrypted using a SSL session. Communications inside a group are always secured against eavesdropping from nodes not in the group.
B. Testbed Description
In order to demonstrate the proper performance of the previously described mechanisms, the authors have developed a testbed focused in security [17] .
The scenario consists in a secure file-sharing peer-topeer network. Each peer in the network runs the MSD as client and server of a simple file-sharing protocol. Each peer belongs to one or more groups, shares some files and is able to discover and download only the files belonging to the same group that itself. This scenario has two major groups of interest: pupils and teachers. By no means should exams be under the greedy eyes of pupils and they must not to be allowed to change any question. On the other hand, teachers must authenticate themselves and the communication between them must be complete and confidential. This covers every security service in the MSD platform.
Teacher B holding a PDA with a Bluetooth network interface wants to get an exam E from the distributed exams database. He does not know where the file actually is, but his PDA can search for the desired resource. The network in the campus works in a decentralized fashion with many laptops offering bridging to the Internet. One specific laptop (M) offers an internet gateway to Bluetooth devices. This bridge is controlled by students. Teacher B should be able to get the exam E from another teacher A using his Bluetooth PDA connection without noticing the students he is accessing an exam. See Fig. 11 . Figure 11 . The deployment of the testbed Previous to the MSD operation, different groups of users have to be established. We suppose the existence of two groups: teachers and students. Notice that teachers can prove their membership to the teachers group by showing that they know the shared key. See Sec. VI.
Once the MSD is started, teacher A starts the announcement of exams and notes. Exams should only be discovered and accessed by other teachers, while notes are public. Then, the content of MSD service description and messages of the exams server are encrypted using the teachers group key, while the notes resources are sent in clear through the network. This prevents no one but teachers to know about the exams server. When teacher B starts the seeking of exams, he discovers teacher A's server because he is able to decrypt the service description. This includes the URL where teacher B must connect to download the exams. Besides that, stronger application level authentication can be provided upon accessing the service.
Students could attack the system by doing the following actions: publishing of fake exams, sniffing the communications and trying to personify the identity of any teacher to fool another, controlling the bridge between the Bluetooth network and the WiFi network.
Publishing of fake exams
. All students or any other network member with an MSD agent can publish information as a server. However, since they do not know the key of the teachers group they won't be trusted by other teachers.
Sniffing the communications
. As we are in open networks, the eavesdropping of messages cannot be avoided. However, by means of the ciphering mechanisms used in the MSD platform only valid MSD members of the teachers' group are able to read private messages.
Controlling the bridge
. Finally, students or malicious members could misbehave as bridges. This can be considered a kind of Denial of Service attack. When detected, the recovery protocol is executed, discovering another bridge if available and then providing a trusted route to the final server.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented the security mechanisms included in a Multiprotocol Service Discovery System for ubiquitous networks.
Current network scenarios are heterogeneous and are a compound of different technologies such as WiFi, Bluetooth, wired networks, etc. This leads us to a world where networks and services are available everywhere. In the design of such a ubiquitous network service announcement and discovery protocols are crucial.
Current service discovery protocols do not met every requirement for the described kind of networks. Especially regarding security. In order to propose a global solution for secure service discovery in hybrid networks, the UBISEC project was launched. As the result of this project a Multiprotocol Service Discovery platform (MSD) was developed.
This work focuses the security aspects of the above mentioned project. Threats to service discovery protocols mostly concern the impersonation of some other users identity, the secrecy of exchanged information and threats against the availability of services. In this sense, we have explained how data integrity, authenticity, data condentiality, reachability and availability of data are provided in our MSD platform. Besides, we have studied mechanisms to enhance availability of services in the network. Simulations conclude that the best method to share information in ubiquitous computing depends on the characteristics of the environment. Several mechanisms were proposed for typical environments.
Finally we have described a real testbed where the proper performance of the implemented security services and mechanisms has been demonstrated.
